

13D Activist Fund

A Qualitatively Analyzed Portfolio of Activism

January 14, 2026

Class I YTD Net Return: 3.06%

Russell 2000 YTD: 12.81%

AUM: \$100 million

In the fourth quarter of 2025, the I shares (DDDIX) returned .40%, net of fees and expenses (versus 2.19% for the Russell 2000)^{i,ii,iii}. Both were outperformed by the S&P500. We continued to be in a large-cap dominated market which makes it very difficult for active funds to outperform market-weighted indexes. While it is a small sample size of just over one week, 2026 is starting off telling a different story. As we write this letter, the Russell 2000 is up 6.11%, the Fund is up 6.77% and the S&P 500 is up 1.77%. This is the type of market where we expect our Fund to be able to compete on a level playing field.

Despite being a challenged strategy in a growth market, the level of shareholder activism continues to grow. In 2025, we saw an all-time high for the number of activist campaigns initiated in North America (152), a 20.6% increase from 2024 (126) and a 40% increase from 2023 (113). In 2025, the total number of dollars invested in new campaigns surged by over 47% to \$35 billion in 2025 from \$23.7 billion in 2024. Of the 152 activist campaigns this year, 52 were done by non-activist investors. To put that into perspective and demonstrate the evolution of the strategy, in 2009 there were only a total of 50 new activist campaigns by all shareholders, including activists.

Fund Performance ⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾	QTD	YTD	1 Year	3 Year	5 Year	10 Year	ITD
13D Activist Fund (DDDIX)	0.40%	3.06%	3.06%	5.12%	2.76%	8.29%	9.96%
Russell 2000 TR	2.19%	12.81%	12.81%	13.73%	6.09%	9.62%	10.57%

Past performance does not guarantee future results. The fund performance data quoted here represents past performance. Current performance may be lower or higher than the performance data shown above.

Investment return and principal value will fluctuate, so that shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. For the most recent month end performance information, visit www.13DActivistFund.com or call 1-877-413-3228.

Many prognosticate about what economic factors are responsible for the rise in shareholder activism, but the truth is it has very little to do with the state of the economy. Over the past twenty years shareholder activism has evolved from a stigmatized strategy, to an accepted and embraced strategy, and now to a necessity for many. In a world where more and more money is being invested into index funds each year and an increasing number of stockholders can no longer vote with their feet, non-activist managers are feeling the need to resort to shareholder activism to turn around companies and fix poor operations, strategy and capital allocation in order to realize the true intrinsic value. As the percentage of passive investors in the market rises relative to active investors, there will be fewer investors who buy and sell based on fundamentals and a catalyst will be more necessary to realize intrinsic value. This is why activism by activist investors and non-activist investors continues to rise. And the emergence of the Universal Proxy Card has given shareholders a great tool to enable them to be more active.

Activism internationally has also taken off. In 2025, there were 119 new campaigns, including 76 in Japan and 30 in Europe. Currently, there are a total of 154 live activist campaigns in Japan and 124 in Europe, and great value to be found in both regions. In fact, the most successful activists this year engaged companies in Europe and Japan and we expect more activists to follow suit in the future. So, as activism evolves, so does the 13D Activist Fund

and in the fourth quarter we included our first investments in Japan (see below for more on that) and will continue to look in the US and internationally for the best activism.

As we have discussed in a prior letter, we have refined our portfolio construction practices to more quickly replace positions where the activist catalyst has not been crystalizing with newer positions with an activist catalyst we believe is stronger. Accordingly, there was a good deal of activity in the portfolio during the fourth quarter. During the fourth quarter of 2025, we exited five positions (more on that below) and added the following five new positions: Ebara Corporation (EBCOY), The Kansai Electric Power Company (KAEPY), Integer Holdings Corporation (ITGR), Six Flags Entertainment Corporation (FUN) and WEX, Inc. (WEX).

Ebara Corporation

This is a Japanese activist campaign by Third Point. Ebara Corporation was founded over 100 years ago and established its roots as an industrial manufacturer of pumps, compressors, chillers, turbines, and related equipment. These core manufactured products ("Fluid Machinery") are the key products in its Building Service & Industrial, Energy, Infrastructure, and Environmental segments, serving infrastructure, power, oil and gas, and building and industrial end-markets. This legacy business is relatively mature and low-growth and not very exciting to investors. However, over the last several decades, Ebara has entered another business: Precision Equipment, quietly becoming a semiconductor capital equipment powerhouse that is high-growth and contributes approximately one-third of the Company's revenue and just over one-half of its operating income. Despite this, Ebara is still viewed as an industrial Company, trading closer to its legacy Fluid Machinery business at 20x P/E versus 30x for its semiconductor capital equipment peers.

Together with peer Applied Materials, the two companies essentially form a duopoly in chemical mechanical planarization ("CMP"). In short, at various stages during the chipmaking process, the surface of the wafer must be flattened (planarized), which is done through a combination of chemicals and abrasives to remove excess material from the surface. Applied Materials specializes in dielectric CMP, 70% of market share, and Ebara in metal CMP, 30%. The complex, connected, and stacked chips that are critical for AI semiconductors demand greater CMP intensity, both dielectric and metal. However, the incremental intensity in advanced packaging is mostly in metal, offering Ebara a clear runway towards enhanced growth and gaining market share. So, there is a significant revenue growth opportunity here without the benefit of any shareholder activism as the market starts to realize the real business driving Ebara's growth.

But like many Japanese companies, there are opportunities to create even more value through light shareholder activism, and Third Point has recently disclosed that it has invested in Ebara and is undergoing active dialogue with management regarding shareholder value enhancement. There are three primary levers for value creation at Ebara: margin expansion, enhanced capital returns, and corporate governance. The Fluid Machinery business has margins of 8% while peers operate closer to 15-20% and the Precision Machinery business has 18% margins, versus 25% to 45% for peers. Applied Materials' EBIT margins are more than double those of Ebara. The Company realizes this and has already taken steps to improve blended EBIT margins by almost 500 basis points to 12% since FY20, but there is still much more that can be done. With the culture inherent in Japan, particularly against laying off employees, we do not see Ebara being able to quickly become a margin market leader among its peers, but there are opportunities to cut costs and optimize pricing that can significantly close the EBIT margin gap that exists today. This becomes even easier as revenue grows, and management can decide to hire slower as opposed to firing.

Next, the Company could afford to return more capital to shareholders. While Ebara returns about 30% of free cash flow to shareholders, its semiconductor capital equipment peers pay out 75-100%. This is a capital light business with few reinvestment opportunities other than iterating on its existing products, meaning that the highest use of capital Ebara could pursue would be returning it to shareholders in the form of dividends and buybacks at its discounted valuation. Lastly, Ebara already has quite good governance for a Japanese company, a unitary Board with a majority of independent directors, none of whom have exceptionally long terms; however, as a global company with a growing semi-cap business, generating a majority of its revenue outside of Japan, Ebara should have a board that reflects this. Instead, it has a Board entirely comprised of Japanese individuals, none of whom

have much meaningful experience in semiconductor capital equipment. Ebara would greatly benefit from the addition of some directors who are Western and have relevant experience in its fastest-growing business.

In short, this is a great business that as-is will deliver adequate returns to shareholders into the future. But great businesses should deliver great returns, and Third Point thinks that can be accomplished with just a few tweaks. These are all highly actionable and minimally invasive value-enhancing suggestions that management should be open to discussing, some of which they themselves have already been working on. Ebara can go a long way to closing its valuation gap to peers just by being seen and valued by the market as an exciting and growing semiconductor capital equipment manufacturer, rather than a mature Fluid Machinery business. Addressing margins, capital allocation and governance issues would really optimize its value. If they cannot do this as a combined company, surely separating the two businesses would go a long way towards accomplishing this, but we wouldn't expect Third Point to be pushing for this right now.

The Kansai Electric Power Company

This is a Japanese activist campaign by Elliott Investment Management. Kansai Electric Power (“KEPCO”) is a diversified utility based in Osaka, providing electrical power primarily to the Kansai region of Japan. It is Japan’s second-largest electric power utility, trailing only Tokyo Electric Power Company (9501.T, “TEPCO”). Notably, it is also Japan’s top nuclear power operator with 6,580 MW of installed capacity from which 48% of its electrical output was derived in FY25. The Company operates three nuclear power stations in the Fukui Prefecture in the Chūbu region. Due to its favorable mix of nuclear energy and limited impact from the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami which resulted in the nuclear accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, KEPCO has risen to be Japan’s most profitable electric power company. 85% of the Company’s EBITDA is derived from its core business, which includes generation, transmission & distribution, and retail, with the remainder coming from non-core businesses, including real estate.

Despite these favorable characteristics, KEPCO has underperformed TEPCO over the past 1- and 5-year periods and was trading at 0.75x price-to-book prior to the announcement of Elliott taking a position in the Company. There are several compounding factors that have resulted in the Company’s recent streak of underperformance. First and foremost, on November 13, 2024, KEPCO announced an over ¥500 billion (\$3.4 billion) equity issuance for no clear reason. Prior to this, the stock had rallied out of 2023 and was regularly trading above ¥2,500 per share, with a Price/Book ratio hovering around 1x. The Company was viewed then as being in a very strong place and ready to ramp up shareholder returns, something that its shareholder base of yield-oriented and retail investors were hungry for. However, the raise left the market scratching its head, and the stock plummeted almost 20% on the news, which made the equity issuance even worse by pricing it at a 20% discount to the announcement price.

This, in part, led to Elliott’s investment in the Company; and Elliott does not make investments like this without a comprehensive and thoughtful plan. There are four key pillars of value creation which could be pursued at KEPCO to improve shareholder value. First, the Company must improve its dividend payout ratio of 22.7%, or ¥60 per share. With the strength of its balance sheet and status as the most profitable electric utility in Japan, KEPCO could easily afford ¥100 per share or more. Not only would this be greatly appreciated by its yield-oriented investor base, but would send the opposite message that its ¥500 billion (\$3.4 billion) equity issuance did. Second, the Company must improve capital efficiency. Despite having a return on equity (“ROE”) of 9%, which is not bad relative to other Japanese public companies, this is below KEPCO’s target of 11% and has been declining the past three years. To make matters even worse and investor confidence even lower, the Company has no capital allocation policy. The Company must formulate and clearly communicate a capital allocation policy that regularly buys back shares to keep its ROE steady or increasing. Funding these increases in capital returned to shareholders leads to the third lever for value creation, the sale of non-core assets. KEPCO has over ¥2 trillion (\$13.5 billion) in real estate investments and non-core businesses, versus a total market cap of ¥2.5 trillion (\$17 billion). The Company reports having ¥809 billion (\$5.5 billion) of noncore real estate listed at fair value. This includes things like office buildings, apartments, shopping centers, and land in the Tokyo and Osaka regions. Moreover, as Elliott knows as an active investor in Japanese real estate behemoth Mitsui Fudosan, these real estate assets could be undervalued and likely worth in excess of ¥1 trillion (\$6.8 billion). With no expertise in real estate investing and Japan cap rates at between 2.5-3.5%, this inefficient use of capital further depresses the Company’s ROE. Next, the Company has another ¥1 trillion (\$6.8 billion) of assets in non-core businesses and other ventures.

These businesses include fiber, mobile, health management support services, call centers, and a 36.75% interest in listed electrical engineering and construction firm Kinden Corporation (1944.T) worth about ¥380 billion (\$2.6 billion). If you back out the value of the Company's real estate investments and non-core businesses, you are left with a growing electric power utility with ¥800 billion (\$5.4 billion) of EBITDA, a ¥500 billion (\$3.4 billion) market cap, and a ¥4.4 trillion (\$30 billion) enterprise value.

Lastly, there are opportunities to improve the profitability of KEPCO's core business. Due in part to its nuclear fleet, KEPCO is the lowest cost electric utility in Japan, approximately 20% lower than Japanese peers. Management has historically operated with a cost-plus mentality, but the commercial market for high and ultrahigh voltage is completely liberalized and competitive in Japan, meaning that they could raise prices and still remain the utility of choice for their high-demand customers. Alternatively, it could maintain its low-price model and pursue market share gains in other regions where peers are charging more. Finally, the Company has a major tailwind in AI and datacenters. As the cheapest source of power, KEPCO should have an advantage in attracting the booming buildout of data centers. In fact, in 2023, the Company announced a 50-50 joint venture with CyrusOne, a leading global data center developer and operator, to undertake hyperscaler data center development in Japan. In February 2025, the two companies broke ground on a 48MW data center outside of Osaka.

Elliott not only has tremendous experience investing in Japan but also knows this industry very well. In November of 2024, they made an active investment in Tokyo Gas Co., Ltd. (9531.T). Like KEPCO, Tokyo Gas also had suboptimal ROE and an extensive non-core real estate portfolio. While not every utility in Japan has such extensive non-core assets, it appears that Elliott has identified the two with the largest portfolios and, thus, the best opportunities to unlock value. Since beginning their engagement, Tokyo Gas has increased its annual dividend, launched two share buybacks of 3.6% and 9% with a total commitment of ¥200 billion (\$1.4 billion) by FY28, improved ROE from 4% to nearly 11%, and has committed to selling off non-core assets and real estate. In just over a year, Elliott has generated a 63.30% return on that investment versus 19.97% for the TOPIX and 14.65% for the Russell 2000 over the same time period. We expect that this campaign at KEPCO will play out in a similar manner, where Elliott will affect change through collaborative engagement and the power of persuasion.

Integer Holdings Corporation

This is a US activist campaign by Irenic Capital Management. Integer Holdings is a medical device contract development and manufacturing organization ("CDMO"). The Company acts as an outsourced design and development partner for original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs"), such as Medtronic, Boston Scientific, and J&J. When developing new medical devices, OEMs typically outsource certain components to third parties, who then become responsible for those parts for the entire lifecycle of the product. Integer is the largest of such companies and the only publicly traded pure play medical device CDMO. From an end market perspective, the Company specializes in cardiovascular and neuromodulation applications, which are generally considered to be very high quality because of their interventional, and therefore highly sticky, nature. Moreover, the stringent regulatory and FDA approval requirements for these markets create very high barriers to change. However, despite this strong market position and competitive moat, the Company's share price has struggled, down over 40% year-to-date.

The catalyst for this downturn was Integer's most recent quarterly report, which disclosed that the market demand for three specific products fell short of the OEM's expectations, causing the OEMs to significantly reduce their orders from Integer. As a result, Integer is now facing an air pocket in growth from 2026 whereas, while the Company typically targets 6-8% organic growth, 2026 is now projected to be between -2% and 2%. Despite management's assurances that this is in fact just an air pocket and that growth will normalize in 2027, the stock fell more than 20% overnight and an additional 20% in the days that followed. A development like this followed by the assurances of management generally does not result in a 40% decline in the stock price. But the nature of Integer's business brings along certain confidentiality constraints around critical information. So, while management can give assurances, they cannot give transparency into its pipeline or the identity of its customers, programs and platforms.

On December 18, 2025, Irenic Capital announced a more than 3% position in Integer and is calling for a Board refreshment and to explore a potential sale of the Company. There are a few reasons why a sale makes sense here. First, as the only public pure-play medical device CDMO, Integer has no public comps and suffers from limited investor and analyst understanding and coverage. Second, as discussed above when a Company is required to have opacity around its sales and customers, it is much easier operated and grown in a private setting. Third, public investors have limited information with which to analyze the Company, where a private buyer subject to a confidentiality agreement would be able to diligence Integer's products, contracts, and pipeline in full detail, allowing them to underwrite future growth with greater confidence. This is not lost on Integer management. In 2024 they explored strategic alternatives and reportedly received bids at a premium to the then current share price (estimated in the \$110-\$115 per share range). While the Company ultimately didn't pursue a transaction, as the stock subsequently rerated, the recent share price pullback suggests that Private Equity interest should remain at a meaningful premium to today's valuation. For example, Teleflex Medical recently announced the sale of its OEM business at approximately 4.7x revenue and 16-17x EBITDA, GTCR acquired CeramTec Medical in 2024 for a similar multiple, and Integer's largest competitors, Resonetics and Confluent Medical, are both PE owned and were acquired at valuations exceeding 20x EBITDA. Extrapolating these multiples to Integer, which currently trades at roughly 2.1x revenue and 10x EBITDA, would equate to an acquisition price north of \$120 per share.

In evaluating this decision, Irenic would like to see a Board refreshment that would include directors with medical OEM experience and financial acumen. This would add needed experience in two areas integral to making a transformative decision like whether to sell or not. Even without a potential sale of the Company, this is a board that needs refreshment. Of the 11 directors, five will have been on the Board for at least 10 years by next Annual Meeting including the Chair, Pamela Baily, who has been on the Board for nearly 25 years. Introducing some fresh perspectives could materially improve the Board's ability to assess the potential options to maximize value for shareholders on a risk adjusted basis.

Irenic has significant experience in strategic activism, identifying companies that are struggling in the public markets and helping implement spinoffs and sales of businesses, often to private equity. Integer fits their playbook perfectly, and while we typically prefer an activist to weigh a standalone thesis against a sale path, it is hard to recall a Company with less justification for remaining in the public market. With the nomination deadline opening January 21, Irenic's next steps, and whether or not they choose to nominate directors, should emerge soon. However, while Irenic is more than capable of running a proxy contest, they have historically received Board representation via settlements, and we would expect them to be looking for the same result here. Moreover, given Irenic's strategically driven approach to their engagements, we would expect them to de-emphasize their governance concerns should the current Board initiate a formal strategic review and receive credible and value accretive offers.

Six Flags Entertainment Corporation

This is a US activist campaign by JANA Partners and Sachem Head Capital Management. Six Flags Entertainment is a regional amusement-resort operator with approximately 27 amusement parks, 15 water parks and nine resort properties across 17 states in the United States, Canada and Mexico. In November 2023, Six Flags announced that it would be merging with Cedar Fair. While this news received backlash from some investors, most notably from activist Land & Buildings, the merger was completed in July 2024. At the time, this merger seemed like an opportunity to combine Six Flags' regional dominance in amusement parks, strong licensing arrangements (such as its lifetime IP agreement with Warner Brothers) and modern tech and pricing backbone with Cedar Fair's operational discipline, best in class park experience and high customer satisfaction rate to generate synergies and elevate Six Flags' asset value.

However, this arrangement has not really gone as planned. In Q2, Six Flags faced severe weather conditions during their typical peak May to June season, which resulted in substantial EBITDA and attendance misses. Moreover, the Company entered this period highly levered from the merger, and these misses only amplified the Company's balance sheet problems in the eyes of investors. This sent Six Flags' share price down over 58% from the completion of the Cedar Fair merger to the day prior to JANA's announcement. Stock action like this on otherwise strong businesses that is due to an idiosyncratic event like weather generally gets the attention of good value investors. However, Six Flags does have other issues, namely poor operational execution, integrating the Cedar

Fair merger and identifying a new CEO, as CEO Richard Zimmerman has announced he is stepping down from his role at the end of 2025.

JANA Partners is now the fifth activist investor in this stock – Sachem Head (4.82%), H Partners (4.59%), Dendur (4.38%), and Land & Buildings (n/a). All of those other activists, except L&B, have received board representation at the Company. JANA, as it often does, is coming in with an All-Star team - Glenn Murphy, Executive Chairman of PetCo and former Chairman and CEO of The Gap, Dave Habiger, Chairman of Reddit, and NFL Superstar Travis Kelce. The investment group holds a roughly 9% economic interest and plans to engage Six Flags' board and management team to explore ways to enhance shareholder value and improve the guest experience. Much of JANA's campaign echoes the qualms already raised by the other activists in the stock, including the Company's potential to unlock value by reinvigorating the business as a standalone company with a new CEO and/or monetizing the real estate, or even selling the entire Company. Regardless of which plan is pursued, the Company must immediately start down the road of fixing its operational issues.

Operationally, Six Flags has forfeited a substantial opportunity by failing to integrate its consumer-facing technology. More than a year post-merger, Six Flags still operates over 10 different apps, and even basic transactions like purchasing a season pass on the website have been unreliable, so modernizing and streamlining this technology could go a long way. The Company also needs to reexamine its operating strategy during inclement weather and adopt a more disciplined CapEx framework. For example, despite this poor weather during Q2, Six Flags still kept its parks open on more days during this quarter than Q2 the prior year, resulting in significant and unnecessary losses. JANA also believes the Company has the opportunity to leverage its existing real estate to implement year-round and inclement weatherproof experiences, such as indoor skydiving and trampoline parks.

Next, the Company needs to reinvigorate its advertising and marketing. Six Flags is one of the most recognizable entertainment brands, but its advertising has been stale, abandoning regional marketing efforts while also missing the opportunity to leverage its national scale. While the new CEO will likely have good ideas in this area, having access to Travis Kelce, one of the most popular and liked celebrities in the world across all demographics is a valuable potential marketing asset (for example, look what Sydney Sweeney has already done for American Eagle with just one ad). Kelce has not signed on as a brand ambassador or in any capacity other than as a shareholder, but he is a true fan of amusement parks like Six Flags, has already added advertising value to the Company just by talking about it on his podcast and there is always a potential to do more with him either informally or through some sort of an agreement. Brand revitalization catalyzed by Kelce's active involvement provides a meaningful opportunity to lift attendance and engagement at Six Flags. Finally, and probably most importantly, the ongoing CEO process presents a golden opportunity to recruit a world class operator capable of executing upon these initiatives. In the world of shareholder activism, there are not many better opportunities for value creation than the activist having a say in identifying a new CEO for a great but struggling business. With multiple activists participating in this process, we would expect the new CEO to be a first-rate operator with strong views on creating value for shareholders. Moreover, a reconstituted board over the past several years and the addition of Travis Kelce as a potential formal or informal brand ambassador may increase the quality of the candidate pool. In November of 2025 the Company announced that it has hired John Reilly, a seasoned executive with more than thirty years of experience in the amusement and recreation industry. as the new CEO.

JANA is still urging the Company to evaluate a potential sale of underperforming parks and/or the entire Company. Should the Company position itself for a sale, there would likely be both Private Equity and strategic interest. Apollo, for example, attempted to acquire Cedar Fair back in 2010 before their merger fell through due to lack of investor support, and Blackstone already owns Great Wolf Lodge – a complementary asset. In terms of strategics, the growing media and entertainment trend of integrating physical park assets into cross-platform media ecosystems makes the industry a logical candidate. Media titans like Disney and Comcast have already provided the blueprint on how to leverage amusement parks to promote intellectual property. Paramount, the third peer to Disney and Comcast, is the only one without an amusement park after interestingly selling five Paramount Parks to Cedar Fair in 2006. This becomes even more intriguing now that Paramount has made a bid to acquire Warner Brothers. Six Flags has a licensing agreement with Warner Brothers and at a current \$2.6 billion market cap, would be a logical add-on to its acquisition by Paramount, or any strategic investor for that matter, including Netflix.

JANA is a highly experienced activist with a track record for showing up with operators tailor-made for a Company's specific problems, and that's exactly what they have done here. The perfect brand ambassador and two corporate legends with almost unparalleled consumer and technology-based operational turnaround expertise may be exactly the medicine required here. With that in mind, we would normally argue that this is too crowded of a shareholder base for JANA to gain Board representation, as there are already six directors on the Board who were appointed pursuant to an activist settlement. However, we believe that the activists with representatives already on the Board are like-minded to JANA and would welcome directors of this quality to help pursue a path they all seem to agree on.

WEX, Inc.

This is a US activist campaign by Impactive Capital. WEX is a diversified payments company with three high-quality, market-leading segments - Mobility (~50% of revenue), Corporate Payments (~20%), and Benefits (~30%) - each characterized by strong competitive moats, recurring revenue, dominant market share (30–50%), and long-standing customer relationships. Despite these strengths, WEX trades at a deeply discounted valuation of ~9.2x NTM P/E versus its historical average (~17x) and peers (~19x).

Impactive Capital attributes this valuation gap to four core issues: (i) poor capital allocation, with incremental ROIC averaging approximately 9% under CEO Melissa Smith versus approximately 21% at peer Corpay; (ii) empire building via non-core acquisitions (e.g., E-Net, Payzer), resulting in an overly complex asset mix valued at the lowest common denominator between its higher multiple benefits segment and its payments businesses; (iii) operational under-earning, driven by bloated SG&A and underutilized pricing power; and (iv) weak governance and misaligned incentives, including revenue-based compensation that encourages growth over value creation. CEO Smith has earned roughly \$100 million during her tenure while WEX has underperformed the market by nearly 130 percentage points.

After investing in 2022 and remaining a constructive, private shareholder for over two years, Impactive escalated its campaign in 2025, opposing three incumbent directors. Although ISS and Glass Lewis had already issued recommendations when Impactive made their opinion public, shareholder support for these directors fell to just 57–67%, placing them among the lowest-supported directors in the S&P 400. Building on this momentum, Impactive announced a full proxy contest for the 2026 Annual Meeting, nominating a slate of directors and arguing that the current Board and management are incapable of executing meaningful value creation. Impactive sees approximately 50% upside from spinning off the higher-multiple Health Benefits business, and 20% to 40% upside from closing a 15–20 point margin gap with peers through better pricing and cost rationalization. Together with improved governance and investor confidence, Impactive sees a potential 2–3x return over three years.

WEX has responded defensively, appointing a new director in David Foss a week after Impactive's nominations and in 2026, announcing a Board refreshment plan that elevates David Foss to Vice Chairman and Lead Independent Director while retiring two directors. We see these moves as cosmetic changes designed to preserve the status quo rather than address fundamental issues, setting the stage for a contested 2026 shareholder vote.

During the quarter, we exited Asbury Automotive Group, Inc. (Impactive), Janus Henderson Group (Trian), Match Group, Inc. (Starboard, Elliott), Performance Food Group Company (Sachem Head), and Qorvo Inc. (Starboard). Asbury was sold after many years in our portfolio and a positive, but not great, return to make room for investments we had more conviction in. Match was sold with a little positive return after Elliott exited its position and the catalyst was not getting any real traction. Performance Food Group was sold after the Company announced that it was no longer pursuing a potential combination with US Foods, the main catalyst we had underwritten. And Qorvo and Janus were exited after they had agreed to be acquired for a nice premium to our cost.

We appreciate your support and please feel free to call with any questions.



Ken Squire

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No Assurance of Investment Return and Important Risks: In considering any investment performance information contained in the Materials, prospective investors should bear in mind that past or estimated performance is not necessarily indicative of future results and there can be no assurance that a Fund will achieve comparable results, implement its investment strategy, achieve its objectives or avoid substantial losses or that any expected returns will be met. Mutual Fund investing involves risk including loss of principal. There can be no guarantee that any strategy will be successful. Overall stock market risks will affect the value of individual instruments in which the Fund invests. Factors such as economic growth, market conditions, interest rate levels, and political events affect the U.S. securities markets. When the value of the Fund’s investments goes down, your investment in the Fund decreases in value and you could lose money. The Fund is a non-diversified investment company, which makes the value of the Fund’s shares more susceptible to certain risks than shares of a diversified investment company. The Fund has a greater potential to realize losses upon the occurrence of adverse events affecting a particular issuer. The value of small or medium capitalization company stocks may be subject to more abrupt or erratic market movements than those of larger, more established companies or the market averages in general. An investor should also consider the Fund’s investment objective, charges, expenses, and risk carefully before investing.

Index Comparison: Historical performance results for investment indices have been provided for general comparison purposes only. Indices may include holdings that are substantially different than investments held by the Fund and do not reflect the strategy of the Fund. It should not be assumed that your account holdings correspond directly to any comparative indices. Comparisons to indices have limitations because indices have risk profiles, volatility, asset composition and other material characteristics that may differ from the Fund. The indices do not reflect the deduction of fees or expenses. Performance of equity indices reflects the reinvestment of dividends. Indices are unmanaged and investors cannot invest in an index or category. Index data is obtained from unaffiliated third parties and is subject to subsequent adjustments. 13D makes no assurances as to the accuracy or completeness thereof.

Glossary (in order of appearance): **SMID** refers to small and mid-cap companies. **MAG7** refers to a group of seven high-performing, influential stocks in the technology sector – Alphabet (GOOGL), Amazon (AMZN), Apple (AAPL), Meta Platforms (META), Microsoft (MSFT), NVIDIA (NVDA), and Broadcom (AVGO). **AI** refers to Artificial Intelligence and the artificial intelligence sector. **M&A** stands for Mergers & Acquisitions. The **Russell 2000 Index** measures the performance of the small-cap segment of the US equity universe and is constructed to provide a comprehensive and unbiased small-cap barometer by being completely reconstituted annually to ensure larger stocks do not distort the performance and characteristics of the true small-cap opportunity set. **SEC** refers to the Securities and Exchange Commission. **IPO** refers to an Initial Public Offering. **COVID** refers to the coronavirus disease and the period in 2019 and 2020 where the disease spread worldwide. **SG&A** refers to Selling, General and Administrative Expenses. **13D** refers to the Securities and Exchange Commission filing that must be submitted within 10 days by anyone who acquires beneficial ownership of more than 5% of any class of publicly traded securities in a public company. **R&D** refers to Research & Development. **EBIT** refers to Earnings Before Interest and Taxes. **TAM** refers to Total Addressable Market. **EBITDA**, or earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, is a measure of a company’s overall financial performance and is used as an alternative to net income. **8K** is a broad form used to notify investors in the US public companies of specified events that may be important to shareholders or the SEC. **ISS** refers to the American proxy advisory firm. **PR** refers to Public Relations. **FY** refers to Fiscal Year.

Top 10 Holdings as of 12/31/2025: 1) Twilio, Inc. 8.69% 2) Mercury Systems, Inc. 7.62% 3) Viasat Inc. 6.99% 4) Autoliv Inc. 6.67% 5) Pearson PLC 6.47% 6) Charles River Laboratories. 5.62% 7) Exelixis, Inc. 5.30% 8) Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc. 5.13% 9) BILL Holdings, Inc. 4.94% 10) Workiva, Inc. 4.51%. Allocations should not be viewed as predictive composition of the Fund’s portfolio, which may change at any time.

The foregoing information has not been provided in a fiduciary capacity under ERISA, and it is not intended to be, and should not be considered as, impartial investment advice.

ⁱ Data is presented through 12/31/2025, unless otherwise stated. Returns are shown for the Fund's Class I share class (DDDIX) net of the Total Expense Ratio of 1.51%. Inception to date (ITD) returns are calculated on an annualized basis using daily performance. All returns include dividend and capital gain distributions. The Total Expense Ratio represents the expense ratio applicable to investors and is comprised of 13D's management fee, indirect expenses such as the costs of investing in underlying funds and other expenses as noted in the Fund's Prospectus. There is neither a front-end load nor a deferred sales charge for DDDIX. Please see the Fund's Prospectus.

ⁱⁱ Indices are provided for general comparison purposes only and may include holdings that are substantially different than investments held by the Fund and do not reflect the strategy of the Fund. Comparisons to indices have limitations because indices have risk profiles, volatility, asset composition and other material characteristics that may differ from the Fund. The indices do not reflect the deduction of fees or expenses. Performance of equity indices reflects the reinvestment of dividends. Indices are unmanaged and investors cannot invest in an index.

ⁱⁱⁱ The Fund has switched from the Russell 2500 benchmark to the Russell 2000 because we believe it is more correlated to our portfolio and because it is the benchmark used by most of the activist funds we follow.

Past performance does not guarantee future results. The fund performance data quoted here represents past performance. Current performance may be lower or higher than the performance data quoted above. Investment return and principal value will fluctuate, so that shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. There is no guarantee that any investment strategy will achieve its objectives, generate profits or avoid losses. For the most recent month end performance information, visit www.13DActivistFund.com or call 1-877-413-3228.